

Dominic Roser
Stefan Riedener
Markus Huppenbauer (Eds.)
Effective Altruism
and Religion
Synergies, Tensions, Dialogue


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Effective Altruism and Religion

P V E R
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Foreword

When I first heard about effective altruism, I assumed it was a Christian movement. Followers of effective altruism were trying to put into action the commandment to love their neighbour, or trying to abide by Jesus's words to the rich man: "If you wish to be perfect, go, sell your possessions, and give the money to the poor."¹ To my surprise, not only was effective altruism not primarily a Christian movement, but many Christians seemed suspicious of it.

As discussions of effective altruism came up, two worries were voiced most frequently among the Christians with whom I spoke. The first was that the focus on being "effective" – on saving the most total lives or on maximising the lives saved per dollar – reduces humanity to a mass to be weighed and measured, leaving no room to love one's neighbour as an individual made in the image of God: an individual who deserves our attention regardless of the cost of helping him. The second was that some of the more "fringe" elements of the movement, focused on extending human life indefinitely or colonising other planets, located the salvation of the world in human progress and a future utopia, rather than in something less bound in temporal existence. Not human enough, and too human.

I am a Christian, so I am particularly attuned to the reception of effective altruism among Christians. But I suspect that those from other religious traditions have had similar experiences. Effective altruism can initially seem like a movement that *embodies* their religious commitments, but their co-religionists turn out to be suspicious of it.

Effective altruists do not appear all that impressed with religion, either. The vocal majority of those involved in the effective altruist movement are non-religious, some having explicitly left the religious tradition of their youth. And they have worries about religious practitioners. Some simply worry that religious people are not particularly prone to thinking through things rationally—that they prefer tradition, authority, or plain old superstition to evidence-gathering. Others worry that the religious focus on spiritual things distracts from meeting the immediate and pressing needs

1 Matt. 19:21, New Revised Standard Version.

of food, shelter, and health; or that the focus on eternal things leads to complacency about temporal suffering.

Both religious commitment and effective altruism demand a singular focus. They both demand that one keep a particular aim at the forefront of one's mind, and make the bulk of one's life decisions with this aim in view. And they each can see the other as a competitor for that singular focus. As we know, you can only serve one master.

But, curiously, religious commitment and effective altruism are united in telling us we should not serve *mammon*. They are united in claiming that the ordinary, 21st-century American and Western European way of living has gone *drastically* wrong, and that we need to create a different way of living from the ground up. They are united in thinking that people who are not part of our everyday social group should occupy a *much larger* part of our concern. They are united in thinking that our focus should be on others rather than on ourselves, not just part of the time, but as a way of life.

So it seems that we ought to rethink the relationship between religious commitment and effective altruism; and that is just what the essays in this volume aim to do. While there have been some notable volumes addressed to religious audiences urging them to be both more altruistic (e.g., Ronald Sider's *Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger*) and more effective (e.g., Bruce Wydick's *Shrewd Samaritan*), nothing has been written directly on the relationship of religious commitment and effective altruism as a distinct movement that goes by that name.

The essay writers are commended not only for their insights, but for framing the questions and shaping the discussion, since they are writing against a background of very little that has come before. Dominic, Markus, and Stefan are especially commended for bringing together a volume on this topic. While volumes are often praised for moving the conversation forward, this one does something much more difficult, for it begins an entirely new conversation, one that I hope will continue.

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Introduction

1. Effective Altruism and Religion: An Intriguing Encounter

The effective altruism (EA) movement matters. In the past decade, its adherents have put forth an ever increasing number of challenging ideas about how to improve the world the most. They have set about redefining our understanding of the most ethical life for individuals and the most urgent priorities for humanity. But EA is not just new fodder for academic debates or a further addition to a long line of ideologies offering intellectual entertainment. After only a few years of existence, and despite comprising only a couple of thousand people,¹ it has also already left a significant real-world footprint. One reason for this is that a number of highly influential actors have been influenced by its ideas. Bill Gates called William MacAskill, one of the movement's co-founders, "a data nerd after my own heart".² Sam Bankman-Fried – believed to be the richest person under thirty³ – became wealthy precisely in order to promote effective altruist aims. And institutions like the World Health Organization, the World Bank or the UK Prime Minister's Office have been influenced by advice of Toby Ord, another co-founder of the movement. Another reason for EA's real-world effect is the simple fact that its distinguishing feature is a radical focus on impact. So even those of its adherents who are not global players have had remarkable leverage. The movement started out with a focus on channelling money towards poverty eradication. But it soon broadened into a more general project of improving the world as smartly and impartially as possible. And it did not fail to live up to its aim of "using evidence and reason to find the most promising causes to work on, and taking action [...] to do the most good."⁴

The EA movement clearly has a secular character. When leaders of the movement state its core project, or articulate reasons for pursuing it, they rarely ever put forward explicitly religious claims. In a recent survey, 86

1 Moss, "EA Survey 2019."

2 Effective Altruism, "Doing Good Better."

3 Chan, "Hong Kong's 29-year-old crypto billionaire."

4 Effective Altruism, "Effective altruism is about doing good better."

percent of the members of the EA community reported being non-religious, agnostic, or outright atheist.⁵ Indeed Peter Singer, the movement's father figure, has historically been met with profound opposition from religious quarters.⁶

At the same time, the world of charity – or more generally, of people for whom improving the world is a core part of their identity – has long been heavily populated by religious actors. Sometimes the religious background is very explicit. On other occasions it serves less visibly as the underlying motivation of individuals or the historical root of organisations. But it has often been, or still is, important for many. So with the rise of EA, a distinctively secular movement entered a territory that has long been, and still is, importantly shaped by religion. And this overlap has in some sense become even stronger when many effective altruists have become committed to longtermism: the idea that what matters most, today, is setting a good trajectory for the very long-term future. Themes like the end of humanity or a future radical utopia in particular have not always received intense attention outside of religious circles.

From the perspective of traditional, and often religiously influenced charitable initiatives, EA can thus have felt like the new kid on the block. But that kid has come of age rapidly, both intellectually and practically, and must now be taken seriously indeed. It calls for examination and discussion. First and foremost, there's a question about what people of different religions can learn from EA. EA is intellectually and sociologically rooted in very different soil than the charitable efforts of many people of faith. But many of its insights on questions of efficiency are independent from specific conceptions of the good: they should be relevant for a broad array of worldviews. It would thus seem natural that EA's fresh take has lessons to offer. At the same time, there's a question whether people of different religions should repudiate some EA stances as unimportant – or even as outright wrong and dangerous.

But religious perspectives on EA go far beyond the simple questions of what people of faith should accept or reject from the movement. They comprise a whole array of fascinating issues. In particular, there's the opposite question as well. Can EA learn some important lessons from religion? Can religious traditions offer interpretations of, or justifications for, doing good that EA has so far ignored? Have religions produced conceptual resources,

5 Dullaghan, "EA Survey 2019 Series."

6 This opposition primarily concerned Singer's views in bioethics, not his stance about global poverty.

or practical experience, that EA could helpfully adopt? Or should the adoption of EA in religious communities be seen as dangerous from EA's perspective? Finally, may EA in some sense be seen as a quasi-religious movement itself, considering how comprehensively life-orienting it is for some of its adherents?

At a practical level, the intersection between EA and religion is already a lively sphere: there has been an active community of Christian effective altruists for a number of years now, a Facebook group for Buddhists in EA, as well as an effective altruist initiative for Jews.⁷ Astonishingly, however, at a theoretical level, hardly anything has been published on these wide-ranging questions. Aside from a small number of broader discussions about utilitarianism, Peter Singer, and religion,⁸ the body of academic work on EA and faith appears to consist of no more than a handful of articles.⁹ This, it seems to us, is not enough.

2. The Structure and Content of the Book

This book works toward filling this lacuna and getting the ball of discussion rolling. It consists of three blocks of chapters. The book opens with three contributions that provide an assessment of EA from a specific religion's perspective: Calvin Baker discusses Buddhism and EA, David Manheim considers an Orthodox Jewish perspective, and Dominic Roser elaborates on EA and Christianity. The middle block of four chapters then discusses EA in general but with a narrower perspective than a whole religion: Mara-Daria Cojocaru focuses on the type of love at stake, Jakub Synowiec on who counts as a neighbour, Stefan Höschele uses the lens of Relational Models Theory to compare EA and Christianity, and Kathryn Muyskens focuses on asceticism and activism. The book closes with three chapters that each look at a specific theme in EA from a religious perspective: Stefan Riedener examines existential risks from a Thomist perspective, Robert MacSwain explores the question of moral ambition and sainthood, and Markus Huppenbauer discusses donations.

7 <https://www.eaforchristians.org>; <https://www.facebook.com/groups/buddhists.in.ea>; <https://eaforjews.org>.

8 See in particular Camosy, *Peter Singer and Christian Ethics*, and Perry, *God, The Good, and Utilitarianism*.

9 See Liberman, "Effective Altruism and Christianity"; Miller, "80,000 Hours for the Common Good"; Gregory, "Charity, Justice, and the Ethics of Humanitarianism"; Chukwuma et al., "An Evaluation of the Concept of Effective Altruism."

Let us give a slightly more detailed summary of the chapters in this book. Baker begins his examination of Buddhism and EA by noting similarities between the two outlooks: they are akin to each other when it comes to such central commitments as impartially promoting the welfare of all sentient beings. He goes on to argue, however, that Buddhism would significantly diverge from EA on how to most effectively help others: it involves a radically different conception of ourselves and our place in reality – in particular, an idea of the ultimate good as quitting the cycle of rebirth. Nonetheless, Baker suggests that there can be a productive dialogue between EA and Buddhism, and he ends with a couple of constructive insights to this effect.

Manheim situates a number of EA tenets within the context of ancient and contemporary Orthodox Jewish debates: the moral obligation to help, consequentialist reasoning about altruism, cause prioritisation, and the use of reason and evidence to understand effectiveness. He suggests that Orthodox Judaism, with its unyielding emphasis on the Halacha norms, is not compatible with the complete framework of EA. Still, EA is not irrelevant to it. In particular, Halacha is engaged with complex questions about charitable giving, and thus EA insights matter – not to guide or change Halacha, but to inform it.

Roser characterises EA in terms of seven core commitments, and examines whether Christians can share these commitments. His verdict is very positive. The core EA commitments are not only compatible with Christianity, but novel and useful tools for living out Christian faith. So Christians ought to take up many of EA's insights. However, Roser also mentions a tension between the EA mindset and Christian faith: while EA is concerned with taking control and actively shaping the world in accordance with our values, a core thread in Christianity encourages us to renunciate control and to place ourselves trustingly in God's hands.

Cojocaru focuses on the “heart” in EA, or the concept of “love” that is central to it and to many religions. Building on Iris Murdoch, she distinguishes two spheres of morality: a public and a private one. In the former, agents operate on simple, uncontroversial ideas of the good, and utilitarian norms seem relevant. In the latter, however, much more complex conceptions of the good become pertinent, and those will only be detectable through really looking at the particulars of another person or a relationship. Different kinds of love operate at these different spheres. EA, Cojocaru claims, often ignores that humans need partial relations and perspectives in order to learn what is good.

Synowiec starts from the Christian imperative to love our neighbours. Along with other authors in this volume, he brings up the parable of the Good Samaritan and focuses on its core question: “who is my neighbour?” On standard interpretations of EA, the relevant neighbours would be all beings with interests – regardless of species, geographical distance, or temporal distance. Can Christianity share this understanding? Synowiec proposes a biblical interpretation according to which “neighbours” are persons that we can personally affect. He argues that, given the characteristics of our times, this includes all contemporary people. Animals are not exactly neighbours, but we have sufficient knowledge and power to treat them as such. Far future people are not neighbours either – and indeed, we have neither the knowledge nor the power to treat them as if they were.

Höschele discusses EA and Christian ethics through the framework of Relational Models Theory. According to this theory, there are four “elementary forms” of human sociality: four models of human interaction, governed by different norms. So Höschele asks which kinds of models, or human interaction, EA and Christian morality envision. He concludes that EA and New Testament ethics largely agree on the key element that characterises moral actions: the kind of love that values the other as much as the own person. Still, effective altruists and Christians can learn from each other, challenge each other on blind spots, and together steer philanthropy to appropriate levels of reflection and action.

Muyskens suggests that EA needs a kind of asceticism. She argues that charitable donation is not enough to stop systemic inequality or structural violence. Indeed, a focus on “charity” may even contribute to such injustice. And the cost-benefit analysis and randomised controlled trials favoured by the movement can produce distinctly biased perceptions of harms. So the traditional focus of EA on charity has problematic aspects. As a remedy, she argues, EA needs an ascetic type of action tackling systemic injustice, addressing the roots of the problem more directly.

Riedener examines EA’s focus on reducing risks of human extinction, and asks whether such a focus can be justified within a Thomist moral framework. He argues that it can: Thomas’s idea of the human end, his emphasis on the virtue of humility, and his conception of the place of humanity in the cosmos imply that anthropogenic extinction would be a tremendous moral disaster – a cosmologically important prideful failure to fulfil our God-given role. And this, Riedener suggests, should not only be relevant for Christians quite generally: similar thoughts also emerge on non-religious worldviews, based e.g. on the import of human dignity.

MacSwain discusses the relationship between EA, supererogation and sainthood. He begins with a discussion of supererogation in Singer, Urmson and Wolf – suggesting that according to Singer, effective altruists are not saints because their actions are often not supererogatory. He then argues for a reconsideration of Robert Merrihew Adams’s notion of “real saints”, as people who follow their own vocations. This suggests that some, but not all effective altruists are saints – just like some, but not all, non-EA people are saints.

Finally, Huppenbauer explores charitable giving. He looks at the motives for which people donate, endorses the moral obligation to give, and examines questions about when, how, and how much we should donate. He then considers two challenges to the present culture of donating: EA and a movement advocating social investment instead of donation. Concerning the former, he articulates a worry: if improving the world is such a dominant concern as it is for many effective altruists, and if there is no understanding of a good life outside of morality, people threaten to become “morality machines” – and to thus miss the meaning of life.

If there is anything like a common thread through these essays, then perhaps it is this: the relation between religions and EA is not without tensions, contradictions and differences. But in spite of this, or perhaps precisely because of it, a deepened dialogue will be mutually beneficial. Beyond this shared thread, we find that the essays also manifest a beautiful diversity: they are written from different backgrounds in religion, theology or philosophy, ask different questions and come to different conclusions. Thus they illustrate the richness of our topic. And they certainly still only cover a small part of the questions that emerge at the intersection between religion and EA. In particular, the majority of them still focus on Christianity. It is our firm hope that this collection is the beginning of a much larger story – the story of a more extensive and more serious engagement of religious people of all kinds with EA’s ideas and practices.

3. The Book’s Story

This book is not just the beginning of one story. It is also the end of another. This latter story had its bright and its sad moments. It started out in the late summer of 2019 with an inspiring workshop at the University of Fribourg entitled “Religious Perspectives on Effective Altruism”. The present book is the outcome of this workshop: all the chapters, except for Calvin Baker’s, were presented there.

On a warm summer day one year later, Markus Huppenbauer, the workshop's co-organiser and the book's co-editor, unexpectedly passed away. This was a tremendous shock. It is difficult to see how others could fill Markus's footsteps. While we, the remaining co-editors, occasionally disagreed profoundly with him on the promise of EA, our discussions about it were always delightful and informative. Markus had a uniquely generous and cheerful way of engaging with his interlocutors. And he always displayed an unflinching desire to push the debate forward, a strong commitment to making room for all kinds of viewpoints, and a remarkable boldness in taking up unpopular stances himself. Markus's plan was to revise the public talk he gave at the 2019 workshop for the purpose of this book. Sadly, he couldn't implement this plan anymore. Upon reflection, we decided to publish a translated transcript of his talk, and ask readers to keep in mind that he did not get the chance to edit and polish it anymore. We miss Markus dearly, and find that his talk – which seems characteristic of his style, attitude, and position – serves as a fitting memory.

This book has profited a lot from the generous efforts of many people. We are particularly grateful to Ludovico Conti, Véronique Dupont, and Joe Tulloch who got the manuscript in good shape. We would also like to thank Aryeh Englander, Elie Hassenfeld, Caleb Huffman, Frances Kissling, and Ben Schiffman for their substantive inputs as well as Sarah Kirkby and Arianna Lanfranchi for their work on Markus Huppenbauer's chapter. We are indebted to Beate Bernstein from Nomos who skilfully led the book through the publication process. Without the funds from the Center for Religion, Economy and Politics and the University of Fribourg this whole project would not have been feasible in the first place. We would like to express our appreciation for their support.

We hope that the efforts of all these people and institutions – and particularly of the authors – will prove fruitful. May ensuing discussions not overemphasise differences between religions and EA. Rather, may all sides collaborate productively and take up insights from each other. The vision of a much better world inspires many effective altruists and people of faith alike. The beauty and importance of this goal, and the fact that at bottom it is shared, mean we should all listen to each other.

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Buddhism and effective altruism

Abstract

This article considers the contemporary effective altruism (EA) movement from a classical Indian Buddhist perspective. Following barebones introductions to EA and to Buddhism (sections one and two, respectively), section three argues that core EA efforts, such as those to improve global health, end factory farming, and safeguard the long-term future of humanity, are futile on the Buddhist worldview. For regardless of the short-term welfare improvements that effective altruists impart, Buddhism teaches that all unenlightened beings will simply be reborn upon their deaths back into the round of rebirth (*samsāra*), which is held to be undesirable due to the preponderance of *duḥkha* (unsatisfactoriness, dis-ease, suffering) over well-being that characterizes unenlightened existence. This is the *samsāric* futility problem. Although Buddhists and effective altruists disagree about what ultimately helps sentient beings, section four suggests that Buddhist-EA dialogue nonetheless generates mutually-instructive insights. Buddhists – including contemporaries, such as those involved in Socially Engaged Buddhism – might take from EA a greater focus on explicit prioritization research, which seeks knowledge of how to do the *most* good we can, given our finite resources. EA, for its part, has at least two lessons to learn. First, effective altruists have tended to assume that the competing accounts of welfare converge in their practical implications. The Buddhist conception of the pinnacle of welfare as a state free from *duḥkha* and, correspondingly, the Buddhist account of the path that leads to this state weigh against this assumption. Second, contrasting Buddhist with effective altruist priorities shows that descriptive matters of cosmology, ontology, and metaphysics can have decisive practical implications. If EA wants to give a comprehensive answer to its guiding question – “how can we do the most good?” – it must argue for, rather than merely assume, the truth of secular naturalism.

Introduction

This article addresses the following question: What perspective would Indian Buddhist philosophy take on effective altruism (EA)? EA is a young social movement that seeks to discover how we can maximise our altruistic impact and to put its discoveries into practice. In articulating an Indian Buddhist perspective on EA, we will focus on Indian Buddhist philosophy from approximately the first through eighth centuries CE, which corresponds to what Jan Westerhoff has recently described as the golden age of Indian Buddhist thought.¹

1 Westerhoff, *The Golden Age*.

Neither Indian Buddhist philosophy (henceforth, “Buddhism”)² nor EA is monolithic in its outlook. Both, however, are centred on core practices and commitments, which makes it possible to use the phrases “Buddhism” and “EA” meaningfully. When possible, I will conduct the discussion in terms that all schools of Buddhism would accept, and likewise for all branches of EA. When this is not possible, I will make it clear where the schools and branches diverge and what the implications of these divergences are.

Before outlining the article, it is worthwhile to motivate our guiding question. Why would we care what view an ancient philosophical tradition might take of a contemporary social movement? One reason is that inter-traditional philosophical dialogue can generate mutually-instructive insights. A second reason is that EA has tried to position itself as a movement whose aims are endorsable – and perhaps even required – by a wide range of ethical positions. Thinking carefully about how Buddhism would evaluate EA is one way to put this claim to the test. Third, there are several interesting *prima facie* similarities between Buddhism and EA. Each is centrally concerned with promoting the welfare of moral patients, which for both saliently includes, but is not necessarily limited to, alleviating suffering. The scope of welfare promotion is also similarly broad for each. Buddhism and most in EA agree that moral patienthood extends to all sentient beings. Regarding which sentient beings to benefit, EA is strongly impartial, and prominent strands of Buddhist thought point in this direction as well. Finally, some contemporary Buddhist practitioners (though, to be clear, not classical Indian Buddhists) believe that Buddhism and EA are kindred spirits when it comes to helping others. After a public conversation with Peter Singer, one of EA’s major philosophical proponents, Matthieu Ricard, a Western-scientist-turned-Tibetan-Buddhist-monk and author of *Altruism* (2013), concluded that there is “no fundamental difference” between the stances he and Singer take on altruism.³

Despite these *prima facie* similarities, I will argue that Buddhism significantly diverges from EA in its practical and theoretical approach to altruism. The article proceeds as follows: sections one and two respectively give barebones introductions to EA and Buddhism. With this background in place, section three articulates a critical Buddhist perspective on EA.

- 2 I refer to Indian Buddhist philosophy as “Buddhism” only for the sake of brevity. I am not suggesting that Buddhism is reducible to philosophy or that non-Indian schools are ingenuine expressions of the tradition.
- 3 Matthieu Ricard, “Altruism Meets Effective Altruism.”

Section four concludes with insights that Buddhism and EA might take from the dialogue.

1. Effective Altruism

I will follow William MacAskill, who co-founded EA with Toby Ord, in understanding the movement as devoted to a bipartite project.⁴ The first part of the project is to make rigorous use of evidence and reason to discover how to maximise the good, given finite resources, without violating any side-constraints like human rights.⁵ (“Resources” denotes anything that can be permissibly utilised to promote the good, such that the term refers not only to financial assets but also, e.g., to hours of research.) The good is provisionally equated with the welfare of moral patients, considered impartially. The second part of the project is to practically apply the conclusions of the first part. The cause areas on which EA has primarily focused so far include global health and poverty, nonhuman animal welfare (especially factory farming), the longterm future of humanity (especially existential risks), and global priorities research (research devoted to the first part of the EA project).

I will also discuss a set of normative principles that I take to motivate EA’s bipartite project. I include the set for two reasons. First, it is plausible that social movements require guiding normative commitments to be distinctive *qua* movements⁶ and, more fundamentally, to *be* social movements at all.⁷ Second, I believe that most EAs would endorse the principles and that their conjunction justifies and explains characteristic EA behaviour. Since people participate in social movements and undertake substantive projects for (perceived) normative reasons, and since movements and projects are subject to normative assessment, including a set of motivating principles deepens our understanding of EA. I base the first three principles closely on those proposed by Berkey and by Crisp and Pummer;⁸ the fourth is my own contribution. The principles are as follows:

Strong Welfare Promotion: we have reason to promote the welfare of all moral patients, and this reason is sometimes, though not always, practically overriding.

4 MacAskill, “The Definition of Effective Altruism.”

5 Pummer and MacAskill, “Effective Altruism.”

6 Berg, “How Big Should the Tent Be?”

7 Berkey, “The Philosophical Core of Effective Altruism.”

8 Berkey, “The Philosophical Core of Effective Altruism”; Crisp and Pummer, “Effective Justice.”

Impartial Maximisation: all else equal, when we are acting on the reason to promote welfare, we should impartially maximise the amount of welfare we bring about per unit of resource input.

Methodological Rigour: a rigorous evaluation of the relevant evidence, broadly construed, should exclusively inform our attempts to promote welfare.

Weak Normative Uncertainty: in general, we should avoid basing our normative outlook exclusively on one ethical theory and instead be open to insights from multiple plausible theories. In particular, we should avoid behaviour that is seriously wrong according to common-sense morality, such as violating rights, even if such behaviour would impartially maximise welfare.

Since the inclusion of Weak Normative Uncertainty is the chief way in which my account differs from others in the literature, I would like to motivate the principle before moving on. There are at least two reasons for taking Weak Normative Uncertainty as a core principle of EA. First, on the descriptive level, there is widespread support within EA for taking normative uncertainty seriously. For instance, MacAskill and Ord have published extensively on normative uncertainty⁹ and promulgated their views within EA,¹⁰ with the result that the Centre for Effective Altruism includes moral uncertainty as a key concept in its primer on EA topics,¹¹ “moral uncertainty and moderation” is a guiding value of 80,000 Hours,¹² and “worldview diversification” is central to Open Philanthropy Project’s grant-recommendation strategy.¹³ Second, on the conceptual level, Weak Normative Uncertainty explains and justifies EA’s respect for side-constraints (which may otherwise appear *ad hoc* on an impartial, welfare-maximising framework); agnosticism about what welfare consists in; openness to the possibility that goods other than welfare are worthy of promotion;¹⁴ and interest in “moral circle expansion”, i.e., in identifying entities that are not

9 For a comprehensive overview, see MacAskill et al., *Moral Uncertainty*.

10 See e.g. Wiblin and Harris, “Our descendants will probably see us as moral monsters”; and Ord, *The Precipice*, 213.

11 See <https://concepts.effectivealtruism.org/concepts/moral-uncertainty/>. The Centre for Effective Altruism is responsible for supporting and growing the movement.

12 See Todd and the 80,000 Hours team, “A guide to using your career.” One of the most public-facing EA organisations, 80,000 Hours primarily advises early-career professionals on how to do the most good through their careers.

13 See e.g. Karnofsky, “Worldview Diversification” and “Update on Cause Prioritization.” Open Philanthropy is an EA-aligned research and advisory organisation that *de facto* conducts the grant-making of Good Ventures, a philanthropic foundation with potential assets of \$14 billion (MacAskill, “The Definition of Effective Altruism”).

14 For these first three aspects of EA, see MacAskill, “The Definition of Effective Altruism.”